

**CESNET Root CA Certificate Policy  
and  
Certification Practice Statement**

*Version 1.1*

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# **1 Introduction**

## **1.1 Overview**

This document is the Certificate Policy and Certification Practice statement followed by the CESNET Root CA when issuing and managing public key certificates.

This document is formatted according to RFC 3647 [RFC3647]. There are some sections that are maintained for compatibility although they do not apply exactly to the services required by this Certificate Policy. These sections contain the text “No stipulation”.

Within this document the words ‘MUST’, ‘MUST NOT’, ‘REQUIRED’, ‘SHALL’, ‘SHALL NOT’, ‘SHOULD’, ‘SHOULD NOT’, ‘RECOMMENDED’, ‘MAY’, ‘OPTIONAL’ are to be interpreted as in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

## **1.2 Document name and identification**

### **1.2.1 Policy Name**

This document is *CESNET Root CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement* version 1.1.

### **1.2.2 Object Identifiers**

This document is uniquely identified by the following identifier:  
1.3.6.1.4.1.8057.1.2.3.1.1.

ISO assigned	1
ISO Identified organization	3
US Department of Defense	6
Internet	1
Internet Private	4
IANA registered private enterprises	1
CESNET	8057
PKI	1
Certificate Policies	2
CESNET Root CA Certificate Policy	3
Major Version	1
Minor Version	1



## **1.3 PKI participants**

### **1.3.1 Certification authorities**

The CESNET Root CA is an offline Certification Authority issuing certificates to Certificate Authorities operated by CESNET PKI.

### **1.3.2 Registration authorities**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL be operated directly by the CA administrators. No Registration Authorities SHALL be deployed.

### **1.3.3 Subscribers**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue certificates only to other Certificate Authorities operated by CESNET PKI.

### **1.3.4 Relying parties**

This CP/CPS does not limit the community of relying parties.

### **1.3.5 Other participants**

No stipulations.

## **1.4 Certificate usage**

### **1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses**

Certificates issued by the CESNET Root CA MUST be used in compliance with this CP/CSP.

### **1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses**

Certificates issued by the CESNET Root CA MUST NOT be used for securing financial transactions.

## **1.5 Policy administration**

### **1.5.1 Organization administering the document**

This CP/CPS is administered by the CESNET PKI.

CESNET PKI  
CESNET, a. l. e.  
Zikova 4  
106 00 Praha 6  
Czech Republic

## **1.5.2 Contact person**

Policy Administrator is appointed by CESNET Root CA. Contact details are published at the CESNET PKI repository (see Section 2.1).

## **1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy**

CPS suitability for the CP is determined by the Policy Administrator (see Section 1.5.2).

## **1.5.4 CPS approval procedures**

Proposed changes to this CP/CPS MUST be delivered to the Policy Administrator. The Policy Administrator informs the requester about the review results within one month.

## **1.6 Definitions and acronyms**

### **Certificate subject**

The entity (person, organization, or server) whose public key is certified in the certificate.

### **Certification Authority (CA)**

An authority trusted by one or more users to create and assign public key certificates.

### **CA-certificate**

A certificate for one CA's public key issued by another CA.

### **Certificate policy (CP)**

A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.

### **Certification path**

An ordered sequence of certificates which, together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.

### **Certification Practice Statement (CPS)**

A statement of the practices which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates.

### **Certificate revocation list (CRL)**

A time stamped list identifying revoked certificates which is signed by a CA.

### **Issuing certification authority**

In the context of a particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the certificate.

**Public Key Certificate**

A data structure containing the public key of an end-entity and some other information, which is digitally signed with the private key of the CA which issued it.

**Registration authority (RA)**

An entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of certificate subjects and for accepting revocation requests, but that does not sign or issue certificates (i. e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA).

**Relying party**

A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that certificate. In this document, the terms 'certificate user' and 'relying party' are used interchangeably.

**Subject certification authority**

In the context of a particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public key is certified in the certificate

**Subscriber**

In the case of certificates issued to resources (such as web servers), the person responsible for the certificate for that resource. For certificates issued to individuals, same as certificate subject. For certificates issued to other CAs, the entity operating the respective CA.

## **2 Publication and repository responsibilities**

### **2.1 Repositories**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish its certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and relevant public documentation in the CESNET PKI repository. The repository SHALL be accessible at <http://pki.cesnet.cz/>.

### **2.2 Publication of certification information**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL make publicly available, in the CESNET PKI repositories:

1. the current version of this CP/CPS,
2. all previous versions of the CP, CPS, and CP/CPS that were in effect for issuing certificates,
3. the current version of CRL.

### **2.3 Time or frequency of publication**

All documents SHALL be published in the CESNET PKI repository after their approval by the Policy Administrator.

### **2.4 Access controls on repositories**

Information listed in Section 2.2 SHALL be publicly available. The information published in the repository SHALL be protected against any unauthorized modification.

## **3 Identification and authentication**

### **3.1 Naming**

#### **3.1.1 Types of names**

The CESNET Root CA assigns each entity a non-empty X.501 Distinguished Name (DN) which serves as a unique identifier of the entity. The DN is inserted in the subject field of the certificate(s) issued to the entity.

#### **3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful**

The names contained in a certificate **MUST** be meaningful in the sense that the CESNET Root CA has proper evidence of the existent association between these names and the subscriber.

#### **3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers**

No stipulations.

#### **3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms**

Names in certificates **SHOULD** be interpreted according to RFC 5280 [RFC5280].

#### **3.1.5 Uniqueness of names**

Every Subject DN **SHALL** be associated with exactly one entity.

#### **3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks**

No stipulations.

### **3.2 Initial identity validation**

#### **3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key**

The requester **MUST** prove possession of the private key which corresponds to the public key in the certificate request. The possession **SHAL** be proved by submitting a digitally signed PKCS#10 request or by providing another cryptographically equivalent demonstration.

#### **3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity**

The CESNET Root CA **SHALL** issue certificates only to CAs operated by CESNET PKI.

### **3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity**

Subject CAs certified by the CESNET Root CA are operated by members of the CESNET PKI team. These operators are personally known or identical to the operators of the CESNET Root CA.

### **3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information**

None.

### **3.2.5 Validation of authority**

See Section 3.2.3.

### **3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation**

No stipulations.

## ***3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests***

### **3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key**

Identification and authentication for routine re-key SHALL be accomplished using the same procedures as for initial registration.

### **3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation**

Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation SHALL be accomplished using the same procedures as for initial registration.

## ***3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request***

A request for revocation of a certificate issued by the CESNET Root CA SHALL be made by a member of the CESNET PKI team or any entity who can prove possession of the private key corresponding to the certificate.

## **4 Certificate life-cycle operational requirements**

### ***4.1 Certificate Application***

#### **4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application**

A certificate application **MUST** be submitted by a member of the CESNET PKI team.

#### **4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities**

No stipulations.

### ***4.2 Certificate application processing***

#### **4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions**

A certificate application **SHALL** be delivered personally by the requester to the CESNET Root CA Security Officer using a secure off-line media.

#### **4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications**

CESNET Root CA Security Officer **SHALL** accept a certificate application only when the following conditions are met:

1. The application has been delivered by a member of the CESNET PKI team.
2. The public key in the application has been verified not to be a known weak key.

### ***4.3 Certificate issuance***

#### **4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance**

No stipulations.

#### **4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate**

The CESNET Root CA **SHALL** convey the issued certificate personally to the Subject CA Security Officer.

### ***4.4 Certificate acceptance***

#### **4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance**

No stipulations.

#### **4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish the issued certificates on request of the Subject CA Security Officer.

#### **4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulations.

#### **4.5 Key pair and certificate usage**

##### **4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage**

The Subject CA private key and certificate usage SHALL be specified by the respective CA CP.

##### **4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage**

The usage of the Subject CA public key and certificate by relying parties SHALL be specified by the respective CA CP.

#### **4.6 Certificate renewal**

##### **4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal**

The CESNET Root CA does not support certificate renewal.

##### **4.6.2 Who may request renewal**

Not applicable.

##### **4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests**

Not applicable.

##### **4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

Not applicable.

##### **4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate**

Not applicable.

##### **4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA**

Not applicable.



#### **4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

Not applicable.

### **4.7 Certificate re-key**

#### **4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL re-key a Subject CA certificate on request made by a Security Officer of the respective Subject CA.

#### **4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key**

Only a Security Officer of a Subject CA may request a re-keying of the respective CA certificate.

#### **4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests**

A re-keying request SHALL be processed using the same procedures as for initial certificate issuance.

#### **4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL convey the issued certificate personally to the Subject CA Security Officer.

#### **4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate**

No stipulations.

#### **4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish the issued certificate on request of the respective Subject CA Security Officer.

#### **4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulations.

### **4.8 Certificate modification**

#### **4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL modify a Subject CA certificate on request made by a Security Officer of the respective CA.

### **4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification**

Only a Security Officer of a Subject CA may request modification of the respective CA certificate.

### **4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests**

A modification request SHALL be processed using the same procedures as for initial certificate issuance.

### **4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL convey the issued certificate personally to the Subject CA Security Officer.

### **4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate**

No stipulations.

### **4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish the issued certificate on request of the respective Subject CA Security Officer.

### **4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulations.

## ***4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension***

### **4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation**

A certificate SHALL be revoked when any of the following circumstances occurs:

- the private key corresponding to the certificate is compromised or suspected to be compromised or lost;
- the respective Subject CA has ceased its operations;
- the certificate has not been issued in accordance with this CP/CPS;
- a Security Officer of the respective Subject CA requests the revocation;

### **4.9.2 Who can request revocation**

Any entity who can prove an occurrence of any of the circumstances for revocation as listed in Section 4.9.1 MUST request revocation of the pertinent certificate.

A Security Officer of a Subject CA MAY request revocation of the respective CA's certificate.

### **4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request**

The party requesting a certificate revocation SHALL submit the revocation request to the CESNET Root CA.

On reception of a certificate revocation request, the CESNET Root CA SHALL:

1. verify the circumstances for revocation
2. verify the identity of the revocation requester in accordance with Section 4.9.2.

If all conditions for revocation are met, the CESNET Root CA SHALL revoke the certificate.

### **4.9.4 Revocation request grace period**

Any party that becomes aware of circumstances for revocation SHALL request a revocation as soon as possible but not later than within one business day.

### **4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL act on a revocation request immediately after its reception.

### **4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties**

Relying parties MUST check the revocation status of a certificate on which they are relying.

### **4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue a CRL immediately after a certificate revocation or at least every 13 months.

### **4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish a new CRL immediately after its issuance.

### **4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability**

No stipulations.

### **4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements**

No stipulations.

#### **4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available**

No stipulations.

#### **4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise**

No stipulations.

#### **4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT support certificate suspension.

#### **4.9.14 Who can request suspension**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.16 Limits on suspension period**

Not applicable.

### ***4.10 Certificate status services***

#### **4.10.1 Operational characteristics**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue direct, full and complete CRLs, i. e. every CRL contains serial numbers of all non-expired revoked certificates issued by the CA.

#### **4.10.2 Service availability**

The current CRL SHALL be available for download continuously.

#### **4.10.3 Optional features**

No stipulations.

### ***4.11 End of subscription***

A Subject CA Security Officer MAY request end of the CA subscription at his/her own discretion.

On receiving a subscription end request, the CESNET Root CA SHALL revoke all valid certificates issued to the subscriber and cease providing services to the subscriber.

## **4.12 Key escrow and recovery**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT provide key escrow service.

### **4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices**

Not applicable.

### **4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices**

Not applicable.

## **5 Facility, management, and operational controls**

### **5.1 Physical Controls**

#### **5.1.1 Site location and construction**

Systems of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be located and operated at a dedicated closed, secure and safe location.

#### **5.1.2 Physical access**

The software of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be stored on an off-line, secure, bootable removable media.

Physical access to systems of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be monitored and restricted to authorized personnel only.

#### **5.1.3 Power and air conditioning**

No stipulations.

#### **5.1.4 Water exposures**

Systems of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be located and operated at a location outside of a flood zone.

#### **5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection**

Fire prevention and protection of the CESNET Root CA site is covered by the CESNET, a. l. e. fire prevention policy.

#### **5.1.6 Media storage**

The media with the CESNET Root CA software SHALL be stored in a safe deposit box in CESNET, a. l. e. premisses. Access to the safe deposit box is continually monitored. Access codes required to open the safe deposit box are known only to the CESNET Root CA Security Officers.

#### **5.1.7 Waste disposal**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL dispose its waste using procedures preventing using the waste to access any operational information, namely:

- all paper waste SHALL be shredded,
- all magnetic media SHALL be physically/mechanically destroyed before disposal.

### **5.1.8 Off-site backup**

Backup of critical part of the CESNET Root CA systems SHALL be stored in a secure place off-site.

## **5.2 Procedural controls**

### **5.2.1 Trusted roles**

Responsibilities at the CESNET Root CA SHALL be divided among different trusted roles:

- *System Administrator*
  - manages PKI hardware and software
- *Security Officer*
  - manages and activates CA signing keys
- *CA Operator*
  - manages CA system configuration
- *Key-share Holder*
  - keeps a part of the CESNET Root CA private key
- *Auditor*
  - performs CESNET Root CA audits

### **5.2.2 Number of persons required per task**

Booting the CESNET Root CA system and activation of the CESNET Root CA signing key SHALL require cooperation of two Security Officers.

### **5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role**

*System Administrator* SHALL be authenticated with a user name and password.

*Security Officer* SHALL be authenticated with a personal PIN.

*CA Operator* SHALL be authenticated with a user name and password.

### **5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties**

No stipulations.

## **5.3 Personnel controls**

### **5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements**

The personnel of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be technically and professionally

competent.

### **5.3.2 Background check procedures**

No stipulations.

### **5.3.3 Training requirements**

The CESNET Root CA personnel SHALL be trained in:

- basic PKI concepts,
- the use and operation of the CESNET Root CA software,
- the relevant documentation including the CP/CPS,
- computer security.

### **5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements**

Training SHALL be provided to the personnel at least annually.

Training in the use and operation of the CESNET Root CA software SHALL be provided whenever the software is updated or changed.

Any change in CP/CPS SHALL be communicated to the CESNET Root CA personnel as soon as possible.

### **5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence**

No stipulations.

### **5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions**

Unauthorized actions will be dealt with by the director of CESNET, a. l. e.

### **5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements**

Not applicable.

### **5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel**

The CESNET Root CA personnel SHALL be supplied with documentation required for their operation including but not limited to:

- the relevant CP, CPS, or CP/CPS
- documentation of the CESNET Root CA software.

## **5.4 Audit Logging Procedures**

### **5.4.1 Types of events recorded**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL record the following events:

- access to the CESNET Root CA safe deposit box,
- registration of a subscriber,
- certificate applications,



- certificate issuance,
- certificate revocation requests,
- certificate revocation,
- CRL issuance,
- initiation of the CA systems,
- activation and deactivation of the CA's signing key.

#### **5.4.2 Frequency of processing log**

Logs SHALL be processed monthly or immediately after discovering a security incident.

#### **5.4.3 Retention period for audit log**

Logs SHALL be retained for at least five years.

#### **5.4.4 Protection of audit log**

Access to logs SHALL be restricted to authorized personnel only.

Logs SHALL be protected against lost and modification.

#### **5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures**

Audit logs are SHALL be backed up with other CA data.

#### **5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)**

The audit collection system is internal to the CESNET PKI.

#### **5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject**

The subjects causing an audit event are generally not notified.

#### **5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments**

Audit logs SHALL be regularly monitored to find potential security incidents and non-standard events.

### **5.5 Records archival**

#### **5.5.1 Types of records archived**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL archive:

- the CESNET Root CA software,
- the CA certificate,

- issued certificates,
- issued CRLs,
- audit logs,
- all implemented CPs and CPSs,
- operational documentation.

### **5.5.2 Retention period for archive**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL archive items listed in Section 5.5.1 for at least five years.

### **5.5.3 Protection of archive**

Archived information SHALL be accessible to authorized personnel only.

### **5.5.4 Archive backup procedures**

Archive records SHALL be regularly moved to an archive media. The media SHALL be stored in a secure place.

### **5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records**

No stipulations.

### **5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)**

The archive collection system is internal to the CESNET Root CA.

### **5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information**

Access to archive SHALL be recorded.

## **5.6 Key changeover**

The following steps SHOULD be taken when re-keying the signing key of the CESNET Root CA:

1. A new certificate with the new key for the CA SHALL be issued.
2. The new certificate SHALL be published in accordance with Section 2.2.
3. The new certificate is used for issuing certificates. Both the new and the old certificate may be active at the same time. The old key SHALL be used as long as all certificates signed by it have not expired.

## **5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery**

### **5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures**

In case of an incident that might lead to compromising integrity of a CA system, the CA personnel SHALL initiate the incident analysis immediately. Further steps depend on the outcome of the analysis.

### **5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted**

In case of hardware corruption, the system SHALL be recovered from backup to a new hardware and brought into operation.

In case of software or data corruption, the system SHALL be recovered from backup and brought into operation.

### **5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures**

When the signing key of the CESNET Root CA is compromised, the CA SHALL:

1. immediately revoke the corresponding certificate,
2. stop accepting certificate applications,
3. inform users about the incident,
4. eliminate the circumstances that lead to the compromise,
5. generate a new key pair,
6. request a new certificate for the CA,
7. restart the CA operations with the new certificate.

### **5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster**

After a disaster, the CESNET Root CA SHALL recover its systems from backup and restart operations. The outage SHOULD NOT take longer than 5 business days.

## **5.8 CA or RA Termination**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL announce its intent to terminate its operation at least 13 months in advance.

Before terminating its operations CESNET Root CA SHALL:

- revoke all issued certificates,
- request its certificate revocation
- destroy the private keys in possession of the CA,
- archive all relevant information in accordance with Section 5.5.

## **6 Technical security controls**

### **6.1 Key pair generation and installation**

#### **6.1.1 Key pair generation**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL generate its private keys in an off-line software security module by the CESNET Root CA *Security Officers* in presence of *Key-share Holders*.

The generated key SHALL be imported to two clean HSMs: an operational HSM and the backup one.

The generated key SHALL be split into 5 cryptographically secured shares each of which SHALL be conveyed to one of the *Key-share Holders*.

#### **6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT generate private keys for subscribers.

#### **6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer**

Subscribers SHALL deliver their public keys in a form of PKCS#10.

#### **6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL publish its certificates in its repository (see Section 2.2).

#### **6.1.5 Key sizes**

An RSA signing key of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be at least 2048 bits long.

#### **6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking**

The CESNET Root CA SHOULD refuse to certify public keys not matching its quality requirements.

#### **6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)**

### **6.2 Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls**

Certificates and private keys MUST be used only in accordance with this policy and for the purpose specified in the Key Usage extension.

### **6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls**

No stipulations.

### **6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control**

Every usage of the CESNET Root CA signing key SHALL be recorded in the key usage log book. These records SHALL contain the date, time and purpose of the key usage and signatures of at least two Security Officers presented at the operation requiring the use of the private key.

### **6.2.3 Private key escrow**

The private key of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be archived using Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm [SSS] in the 3 out of 5 mode. Each individual share SHALL be deposited with one Key-share *Holder*. Each Key-share *Holder* SHALL be in possession of one key-share.

### **6.2.4 Private key backup**

The backup copy of the CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be stored in a HSM stored in an off-site location.

### **6.2.5 Private key archival**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT archive private keys.

### **6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module**

The CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be transferred to two cryptographic modules during the key generation procedure (see Section 6.1.2).

### **6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module**

The CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be stored as unexportable objects in two HSMs.

### **6.2.8 Method of activating private key**

The CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be activated by providing activation data for the pertinent HSM.

### **6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key**

The CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be automatically deactivated after every signature operation.

### **6.2.10 Method of destroying private key**

The CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be destroyed in the following steps:

1. Both the operational and backup HSM SHALL be re-initialized.
2. Both the operational and backup HSM SHALL be physically destroyed.
3. All media holding the CESNET Root CA private key shares SHALL be physically destroyed.

### **6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating**

Cryptographic modules used to store the CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or higher.

## **6.3 Other aspects of key pair management**

### **6.3.1 Public key archival**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL archive its public keys and all public keys submitted as part of a certificate application.

### **6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods**

The CA-Certificate of the CESNET Root CA SHALL be valid for 20 years.

Operational period of Subject CA certificates SHALL be at most 20 years.

Key pair usage period is identical to the operational period of the corresponding certificate.

## **6.4 Activation data**

### **6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation**

Activation data for the HSMs holding the CESNET Root CA private key SHALL be generated by CESNET Root CA *Security Officers* during the private key generation procedure.

### **6.4.2 Activation data protection**

Holders of activation data SHALL be responsible for the protection of their activation data.

Activation data MUST NOT be kept in unencrypted form.

### **6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data**

No stipulations.

## **6.5 Computer security controls**

### **6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements**

The CESNET Root CA computer systems SHALL satisfy the following requirements:

- The issuing system SHALL be loaded only on a dedicated off-line computer hardware.
- No software not required for the CA operation SHALL be installed on the issuing system.
- HSMs holding the CESNET Root CA private key SHALL NOT be connected to any system other than the dedicated off-line computer loaded with the issuing system.

### **6.5.2 Computer security rating**

No stipulations.

## **6.6 Life cycle technical controls**

### **6.6.1 System development controls**

Significant modification of CA systems SHALL be developed and tested on a separated development system.

### **6.6.2 Security management controls**

No stipulations.

### **6.6.3 Life cycle security controls**

No stipulations.

## **6.7 Network security controls**

The issuing system SHALL be loaded only on a dedicated off-line computer hardware.

## **6.8 Timestamping**

No stipulations.

## 7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP profiles

### 7.1 Certificate Profile

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue certificates in accordance with RFC 5280 [RFC5280].

#### 7.1.1 Version number(s)

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue certificates X.509 version 3.

#### 7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The CA certificate of the CESNET Root CA SHALL use the following extensions:

- a) **Basic Constraints** (critical)  
CA: true
- b) **Key Usage**  
*Certificate Sign, CRL Sign*
- c) **Subject Key Identifier**  
key identifier of the CA
- d) **Authority Key Identifier**  
key identifier of the CA

Subject CA certificates SHOULD typically use the following extensions:

- a) **Basic Constraints** (critical)  
CA: true
- b) **Key Usage**  
*Certificate Sign, CRL Sign*
- c) **Subject Key Identifier**  
key identifier of the subscriber
- d) **Authority Key identifier**  
key identifier of the CESNET Root CA signing key
- e) **Authority Information Access**  
*CA Issuers*: URI: locator of the CESNET Root CA certificate
- f) **CRL Distribution Point**  
*URI*: locator of the current CESNET Root CA CRL

#### 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

The CESNET Root CA SHOULD use the following cryptographic algorithms:

**RSA Encryption** – OID *1.2.840.113549.1.1.4*

**SHA1 with RSA Encryption** – OID *1.2.840.113549.1.1.5*



#### **7.1.4 Name forms**

Subject names of all certificates issued in compliance with this CP/CPS SHALL be constructed according to Section Error: Reference source not found.

The subject name of the CESNET Root CA is

cn=CESNET CA Root, o=CESNET CA, dc=cesnet-ca, dc=cz.

#### **7.1.5 Name constraints**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT support the Name Constraints extension.

#### **7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier**

This CP/CPS is identified by the OID defined in Section 1.2.2.

#### **7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT support the Policy Constraints extension.

#### **7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics**

The CESNET Root CA SHOULD NOT support the Policy Qualifier field of the Certificate Policies extension.

#### **7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension**

The CESNET Root CA SHOULD NOT mark the Certificate Policies extension as critical.

### **7.2 CRL Profile**

#### **7.2.1 Version number(s)**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL issue CRLs version 2 as defined in RFC 5280 [RFC5280].

#### **7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL use the following CRL extensions:

- a) **CRL Number:**  
sequential number of the CRL
- b) **Authority Key Identifier:**  
key identifier of the CESNET Root CA signing key

## **7.3 OCSP Profile**

### **7.3.1 Version number(s)**

No stipulations.

### **7.3.2 OCSP extensions**

No stipulations.

## **8 Compliance audit and other assessment**

### **8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL perform an annual compliance audit.

### **8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor**

The regular audit SHALL be performed by the CESNET Root CA *Auditor*.

The CESNET Root CA SHALL enable an audit by a third party when required for its operation support and acceptance. In such case, the entire costs of the audit SHALL be covered by the entity requesting the audit.

### **8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity**

See Section 8.2

### **8.4 Topics covered by assessment**

The audit SHALL verify the compliance of the CA operations with this CP/CPS.

### **8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency**

If any deficiency is discovered, the CESNET Root CA SHALL take actions needed to bring the documentation, operational procedures and configuration into compliance.

### **8.6 Communication of results**

Results of an audit SHALL be considered private to the CESNET Root CA. The CESNET Root CA MAY release audit results to third parties at its discretion.

## **9 Other business and legal matters**

### **9.1 Fees**

#### **9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees**

No stipulations.

#### **9.1.2 Certificate access fees**

No stipulations.

#### **9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees**

No stipulations.

#### **9.1.4 Fees for other services**

No stipulations.

#### **9.1.5 Refund policy**

No stipulations.

### **9.2 *Financial responsibility***

Certificates issued under this CP/CPS SHALL NOT be used for securing financial transactions.

#### **9.2.1 Insurance coverage**

The CESNET Root CA operations are not covered by any insurance.

#### **9.2.2 Other assets**

No stipulations.

#### **9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities**

Not supported.

### **9.3 *Confidentiality of business information***

#### **9.3.1 Scope of confidential information**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL keep the following information confidential:

- private keys of all participants

- other cryptographic data used for CA operations
- all personal data except for those included in certificates
- internal CA documentation except for audit reports published at the discretion of the CA

### **9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information**

Information included in certificates and CRLs SHALL NOT be considered confidential.

### **9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT disclose confidential information to any third party, except when required by law enforcement officials who exhibit regular warrant.

## **9.4 Privacy of personal information**

### **9.4.1 Privacy plan**

When processing personal data, the CESNET Root CA operates in compliance with the law of the Czech Republic.

### **9.4.2 Information treated as private**

Any information that is not publicly accessible or available through the content of a certificate, a CRL, or an OCSP response SHALL be treated as private information.

### **9.4.3 Information not deemed private**

Any information that is publicly accessible or available through the content of a certificate, a CRL, or an OCSP response SHALL NOT be deemed private.

### **9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information**

All members of the CESNET PKI team SHALL protect such information from compromise and disclosure to third parties.

### **9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information**

No stipulations.

#### **9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process**

The CESNET Root CA MAY disclose any confidential or private information to law enforcement officials who exhibit regular warrant

#### **9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances**

No stipulations.

### **9.5 *Intellectual property rights***

CESNET, a. l. e. owns all intellectual property rights associated with this CP/CPS.

### **9.6 *Representations and warranties***

#### **9.6.1 CA representations and warranties**

The CESNET Root CA CA SHALL provide PKI services in compliance with this CP/CPS.

#### **9.6.2 RA representations and warranties**

Not applicable.

#### **9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties**

A subscriber SHALL in particular:

- provide correct and accurate information to the CA,
- immediately inform the CA about any change of information that has been submitted to the CA,
- act in accordance with this policy,
- use certificates and other services of the CA only for legal purposes,
- use certificates only for purposes for which they were issued,
- protect their private keys from compromise, loss, disclosure, or any unauthorized use,
- immediately request revocation of a certificate when it is suspected to have been misused.

#### **9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties**

Before relying on a certificate to verify a digital signature, relying parties SHALL check that at the time of the creation of the signature the certificate was valid, has not been revoked and was issued for the given purpose.

### **9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants**

No stipulations.

### **9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties**

No stipulations.

### **9.8 Limitations of Liability**

The CESNET Root CA SHALL NOT be held responsible for circumstances originated in breaching this CP/CPS by subscribers or relying parties.

### **9.9 Indemnities**

No stipulations.

### **9.10 Term and Termination**

#### **9.10.1 Term**

This CP/CPS shall become effective seven days after its publication and shall become effective until terminated in accordance with Section 9.10.2.

#### **9.10.2 Termination**

This CP/CPS shall remain effective until replaced with a newer version.

#### **9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival**

No stipulations.

### **9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants**

No stipulations.

### **9.12 Amendments**

#### **9.12.1 Procedure for amendment**

Amendments to this CP/CPS MUST be approved by the Policy Administrator (see Section 1.5.2).

#### **9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period**

Any new version of this certificate policy SHALL be published at the CA repository at least 7 days before becoming effective.

### **9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed**

Small changes that will not change the meaning of the certificate policy MAY be applied without changing the policy OID.

Other changes require assigning a new OID for the CP/CPS.

### **9.13 Dispute resolution procedures**

All disputes SHOULD be solved by agreement of the disputing parties. The supreme authority for solving disputes is the director of the CESNET, a. I. e..

### **9.14 Governing law**

The CESNET Root CA operations SHALL be governed by the law of the Czech Republic.

### **9.15 Compliance with applicable law**

No stipulations.

### **9.16 Miscellaneous provisions**

#### **9.16.1 Entire agreement**

No stipulations.

#### **9.16.2 Assignment**

No stipulations.

#### **9.16.3 Severability**

If any of the provisions of this CP/CPS is found to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this CP/CPS SHALL remain effective.

#### **9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)**

No stipulations.

#### **9.16.5 Force Majeure**

No stipulations.

### **9.17 Other provisions**

No stipulations.



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